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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

vs.

:

Case No. 900087

DAVID R. WARDEN,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
1.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme

Court to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (a) (Supp.
1990).
2.

This appeal is from a decision of the Utah Court

of Appeals, reversing the jury verdict of the Second Circuit
Court of Davis County, Layton Department, convicting Defendant of
negligent homicide, a Class A Misdemeanor.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals apply the proper

standard of review for examining the sufficiency of the evidence
presented at trial?
App. 1989).

See State v. Tolman. 775 P.2d 422 (Utah Ct.

2.
that

the

Did the Utah Court of Appeals properly conclude

evidence

presented

at

trial

failed

to

show

that

Defendant's conduct constituted a "substantial and unjustifiable
risk" which was a "gross deviation" from the standard of care?
See Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1990).
3.

Should the Utah Court of Appeals have applied the

standard for "contradictory and conflicting evidence" as opposed
to the standard for "insufficiency of evidence?"
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in State v.
Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), appears as Appendix A
to this brief.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1990)

Definition of criminal
criminally negligent.
*

*

negligence

or

*

A person engages in conduct
(4) With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to the
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he ought to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the circumstances exist or the result
will occur.
The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary
person
would
exercise
in
all
the
2

circumstances
standpoint•
2.

as

viewed

from

the

actor's

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1990)
Negligent homicide.
*

*

*

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes
negligent homicide if the actor, acting with
criminal negligence, causes the death of
another.
(2)
Negligent
misdemeanor.

homicide

is a

Class A

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, David R. Warden, was charged with Negligent
Homicide, a Class A Misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206
(1990).

The defendant was initially tried by jury in the Second

Circuit Court, Layton Department, beginning November 16, 1987;
however, the Court declared a mistrial November 18, 1987 due to
improper testimony

given by one of the State f s witnesses.

A

second jury trial began February 22, 1988, and continued through
February 26, 1988.
The

Defendant was convicted as charged.

conviction

was

Appeals on November 22, 1989.

reversed

by

the

Utah

Court

of

The Court reversed the conviction

because of insufficiency of the evidence, based upon the State's
failure to establish

a "substantial

death."

3

and unjustifiable

risk of

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant
University

of

internship

was

is a physician

Pennsylvania
at

Madigan

having graduated

Medical

School

General

in

Hospital,

from the

1964.
Fort

His
Lewis,

Washington (T. Vol. IVf page 40, lines 8 - 20). After four years
in the military service, he settled in Kaysville, Davis County,
Utah, to practice family medicine where he has been ever since
(Id. at page 43, lines 12 - 20).
family medicine

He was Board certified in

in 1970 and has been so certified until the

present time (Id. at page 43, lines 22 - 25 and page 44, lines 1
- 13) .
During his practice, Defendant attended approximately
2500 deliveries, 300 of which were home deliveries (Id. at page
45, lines 9 - 25) .
hospital

A home delivery patient must be low risk,

facilities should be near in case of emergency

and

there must be family support for the mother and child following
delivery fid, at page 48, lines 1 - 25; page 49, lines 1 - 23;
page 240, line 6; page 242, line 11).
The mother of the deceased child is Joanne Young.
lived

in Kaysville, Utah, with her parents, Maurice

She

and Ivy

Young, who are from England having arrived in the United States
in 1985

(T. Vol. I at page 42, line 19 - page 44, line 7 ) .

Maurice and Ivy are the parents of seven children (Joanne being
4

number 5) all of whom were born in England.

Four were home

deliveries (Id. at page 44, line 24 - page 45, line 3).
Joanne became pregnant out-of-wedlock in early 1986.
She thought conception had occurred in March (T. Vol. Ill, page
40. lines 10 - 15).
Thereafter, Joanne

and

She told her parents in early summer.
Ivy went to see Dr. Mark Bitner who

specializes in obstetrics and was officed at the Tanner Clinic in
Layton, Utah (Id. at page 40, line 10 - page 42, line 18).
They visited Dr. Bitner twice - once on June 27 and
again August 8, 1986 (T. Vol. II, page 173, line 24 - page 174,
line 4 and page 176, lines 15 - 18). A complete OB exam was not
performed on the first visit because there was a question about
payment fid, at page 174, lines 23 - 25 and page 218, lines 1922) because Maurice did not have medical insurance coverage for
his daughter

fid, at page 148, line 14 - page 150, line 8).

Nevertheless, Joanne and Ivy returned for the second visit at
which time a complete OB exam was done.

Her pregnancy was

determined to be normal (low risk) fid, at page 226, lines 16page 228, line 16; T. Vol. Ill, page 202, lines 2 - 4

and T. Vol.

IV, page 243, line 13 - page 246, line 2) and the date of
delivery determined to be in early December, 1986.

However, Dr.

Bitner recommended an ultrasound to confirm that finding because
he was uncertain (T. Vol II at page 219, line 12 - page 220, line
5

12) .

Joanne never returned for the test.

She and her family

were concerned about the cost of a hospital delivery (T. Vol III,
page 101, line 1 - page 104, line 3; T. Vol. II, page 149, line
21 - page 150, line 8 and Id. at page 341, line 7 - page 342,
line 5 ) .
Joanne and Ivy decided on a home delivery and asked
Defendant to attend (T. Vol III, page 49, lines 4 - 15).

They

visited him September 8, 1986 (Id. at page 50, lines 15 - 20).
Defendant examined Joanne and assessed her for home delivery.

He

found her to be a suitable candidate and agreed to attend the
birth of the child (T. Vol. IV, page 51, line 21 - page 59, line
19) .

Defendant

confirmed

the date of delivery

to be early

December, 1986 fid, at page 57, line 3 - page 58, line 9 ) .
saw her again October 6, 1986.

He

The exam did not change his prior

assessment (Id. at page 60, line 9 - page 63, line 12).
On the morning of November 7, 1986, Defendant was at
the University
School

Football

of Utah Football Stadium with the Davis High
Team

as

its team physician

participating in the State Tournament.

where

they

were

He was contacted by Ivy

through his remote telephone and advised that Joanne had awakened
with some vaginal bleeding evidenced by spotting

(T. Vol. IV,

page 67, line 7 - page 69, line 22; T. Vol. Ill, page 107, line 4
- page 106, line 18). Both Ivy and Defendant were concerned that
6

labor was beginning early.

Defendant advised Ivy to keep Joanne

down and call him about 1:00 p.m. or sooner if the situation
worsened (T. Vol. II, page 20, line 7 - 2 3 ; Vol. IV, page 69,
line 7 0 page 71, line 5) .
Ivy called again about mid-day and advised Defendant
that the bleeding had stopped and that John Shaw, the father of
the child, had said conception may have occurred a month earlier
which would have made Joanne full term (T. Vol. IV, page 71, line
7 - page 73, line 19; Vol. Ill at page 108, line 19 - page 110,
line 20; Vol. II, at page 20, line 20 - page 22, line 21 and Id.
at page 339, line 4 - page 340, line 3).
to

call

again

around

5:00

p.m.

if

Defendant advised Ivy

Joanne

appeared

to

be

continuing with labor (T. Vol. IV, page 73, lines 3 - 19).
Ivy called late afternoon and advised Defendant that
Joanne was having occasional contractions.

He instructed her to

call when the contractions were three to five minutes apart (T.
Vol. IV, at page 74, line 24 - page 75, line 25; T. Vol. I, at
page 65, line 17 - page 66, line 23 and Vol II, page 25, line 7line 23).
Ivy called

Defendant

at home about

10:15 p.m.

advised that Joanne was in the last stages of labor.

and

Defendant

arrived at the Young residence at 10:30 p.nu (T. Vol. I, page 67,
line 2 - page 68, line 18).
7

Upon arrival, he met Maurice at the door, went into the
bedroom, examined Joanne, found that delivery was imminent and
delivered a male infant at 10:40 p.m.
breach position
difficulty.
the

amniotic

and was

delivered

The child presented in a

within

one minute

without

There was no evidence of untoward bleeding nor was
fluid

tinged

with

blood.

The

child

breathed

spontaneously without stimulation, had a normal heart rate and
Defendant assessed the infant as having a one minute and five
minute APGAR

score of

8 indicating that the child had good

potential for sustaining life (T. Vol. IV, page 77, line 17page 86, line 5) .
The child was small.
being between 4 - 5

pounds.

Defendant estimated his weight as
Defendant thought it was premature

(T. Vol. IV, page 86, lines 8 - 18).
Following

birth,

the

child

exhibited

symptoms

of

grunting respirations which could be controlled by positioning
the child.
was

Defendant advised Ivy that perhaps hospitalization

indicated.

She

expressed

concern

about

the

expense.

Defendant showed Joanne how to nurse the child, instructed her
how to keep the child warm and told Ivy that she must watch the
child during the night concerning his temperature, color and
respiration and if they worsened to call him.

Ivy acknowledged

the instructions and Defendant left the home at about 11:30 p.m.
8

(Id, at page 96, line 13, through page 105, line 4; Vol, 1, page
85, lines 15 - 18; Vol. Ill, page 122, line 12 - page 130, line
11).
Defendant did not hear from the family until the next
day about noon when he called the home and was advised the child
had died,

(Id. at page III, line 7 - page 113, line 5).
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and the child into

another bedroom where it was warmer.

On two occasions, she

observed that the child's hands and feet were "very blue" which
concerned her.
held him.

About 5:00 a.m. they got the child up and Joanne

He still appeared blue.

They wrapped him in a quilt.

At 8:00 a.m., the child appeared to have stopped breathing.
observed the condition and resuscitated him.
Joanne to be aware of the situation.

Ivy

She did not want

Ivy worked with the child

for approximately 20 minutes (T. Vol. I, page 86, line 17 - page
97, line 24; Vol. II, page 44, line 14 - page 68, line 11; Vol.
Ill, page 136, line 7 - 12).
Ivy called Iris Auger, a friend and neighbor, at about
8:30 a.m. and told her of the birth and that the child was small.
Iris recommended that the child be hospitalized.
were trying to get the doctor.

Ivy said they

Ivy did not disclose to Iris that

the child had appeared to have stopped breathing minutes earlier

9

nor that there was an emergency (T. Vol. V, page 75, line 15page 83, line 3; Vol. V, page 87, line 19 - page 88, line 2 ) .
Ivy called Defendant's office between 8:30
a.m. but he was not in.

9:00

She did not identify herself or report

any emergency concerning the child.
home but he was not there.
or report an emergency.

and

She also called Defendant's

Again, she did not identify herself

(T. Vol. I, page 95, line 20 - page 97,

line 23; Vol. II, page 69, line 6 - page 72, line 5; Vol. V, page
23, line 6 - page 26, line 11).
During the night and morning hours Ivy did not contact
Defendant, did not call the paramedics nor did she take the child
to

the

condition

hospital

notwithstanding

the

child's

deteriorating

(T. Vol. II, page 75, line 14 - page 77, line 11).

She called her Bishop in the LDS Church but did not advise him of
the

emergency.

The Bishop

contacted

Frank

Kramer, M.D., a

pediatrician who went to the Young home (T. Vol. V, page 38, line
2 - page 45, line 3; Vol. II, page 260, line 21 - page 261, line
25) .
The Bishop and Dr. Kramer arrived about 10:30 a.m.
child appeared lifeless.

The

He was rushed to Humana North Davis

Hospital where he was pronounced dead at approximately 11:15 a.m.
(T. Vol. II, page 283, lines 20 - 23; Id. at page 262, line 1page 268, line 9 ) .
10

A post-mortem examination indicated the child died of
respiratory-distress syndrome (R. at page 69 - 71).
Defendant was available by telephone during the night
of November 7th and the morning hours of November 8th•
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals correctly
reversed the conviction of Dr. Warden which should be affirmed
for the following reasons:
First,
standard

of

the

Court

review

of Appeals

concerning

the

correctly

sufficiency

applied
of

the

evidence

presented at trial.
Second,
evidence

at

the

trial

to

appellant
show

failed

that

his

to

present

conduct

sufficient

constituted

a

"substantial and unjustifiable risk" of death to the child such
that he should have been aware of it; and, failed to establish
that his conduct constituted a "gross deviation from the standard
of care."
Third,

the

defense's

testimony

established

that

defendant's conduct was within the standard of care for home
deliveries.
Fourth,

appellant's

contention

that

the

Court

of

Appeals should have applied the standard for "conflicting and
contradictory evidence" is misplaced.
11

The Court did not reverse

defendant's conviction on the grounds that defendant presented
contradictory

evidence,

but

rather

on

grounds

that

the

prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence establishing
Defendant's

criminal

negligence

beyond

a

reasonable

doubt.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE PROPER
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR EXAMINING THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT
TRIAL.
The Court of Appeals correctly applied Utah law in

reviewing the evidence presented at Defendant's trial.

It is

well-settled that an appellate court has the power to review a
case concerning "sufficiency of evidence."
P.2d 48, 49-50 (Utah 1983).

State v. Johnson, 663

The Court of Appeals stated that

"[w]e review defendant's claim under a standard that does not
permit us to substitute our judgment for that of the jury in a
criminal

trial."

See State v. Warden, 784 P. 2d

1204, 1208

(citing State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Quoting Tolman, the court stated:
[w]e
review
the
evidence
and
all
interferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in a light most favorable to the
verdict of the jury.
We reverse a jury
conviction for insufficient evidence only
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
a crime of which he was convicted.
12

Warden, 784 P.2d 1204, 1208 (emphasis added); State v. Booker,
709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); State v, Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475,
477 (Utah 1989).

The standard of review applied by the Court of

Appeals clearly follows Utah precedent.

See State v. Gabaldon,

735 P.2d 410 (Utah App. 1987) (court will review evidence and all
inferences in a light most favorable to the jury verdict.)
On appeal, appellant argues that the changes in the
Court of Appealfs unpublished opinions indicate that the court's
rationale

for

its

conclusion

(Appellant's brief pages
unfounded.

did

17-19).

not

follow

Utah

law

Appellant's assertions are

First, it is inappropriate to challenge an official

opinion with language which has been removed from prior drafts.
Second, by comparing the earlier and subsequent versions of the
Court of Appeals opinion, it is clear from the revision that the
court understood the law which it applied.

The court properly

stated the standard of review and weighed the testimony of the
state's medical expert witnesses in a light most favorable to the
jury's verdict.
Additionally, appellant cites State v. Bolsinger, 699
P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), as precedent for four factors that the
jury was entitled to assess in relation to Defendant's conduct
during

decedent's

birth

(Appellant's

brief,

Appellant's reliance on Bolsinaer is misplaced.
13

pages

19-22).

In Bolsinger,

the defendant was charged
theory

of

"depraved

with

second-degree murder under a

indifference."

The Utah

Supreme Court,

relying on Neitzel v. State. 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska App. 1982),
enumerated "four factors a jury should be asked when it evaluates
conduct

resulting

indifference."

in

death

and

alleged

to

be

depraved

Id. at 1220 (emphasis added).

Both Bolsinqer and Neitzel addressed the factors the
jury should examine when assessing the evidence presented in a
second-degree murder prosecution.

Appellant asserts that

lf

[t]he

jury was entitled to assess each of the . . . factors in relation
to this case to determine whether the defendant was criminally
negligent"
standard

(Appellant's Brief, page 19). However, the mens rea

for depraved

indifference

is substantially

than the standard for negligent homicide.
671 P.2d

142

criminally

different

Compare State v. Dyer,

(Utah 1983) (the difference between reckless and

negligent

conduct

is

that

under

the

former,

one

perceives a risk and consciously disregards it, whereas under the
latter, one fails to perceive the risk).
Appellant's argument confuses two distinct mens rea
standards and, as such, should be disregarded.
A,

The Court of Appeals applied the proper
standard for a Defendant's challenge of
his conviction based on insufficiency of
evidence.

14

Appellant enunciates a standard of review set forth in
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). 1

In Scharf, the

court held:
To mount a successful attack on the trial
courtfs findings of fact, an appellant must
martial all the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings and then demonstrate
that even viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings.
Id. at 1070.

Appellant argues that the Scharf standard "should

have been applied by the Court of Appeals" in the instant case
(Appellant's Brief, page 22).

Appellant's argument is wholly

unsupported by Utah case-law and contradicts the standard of
review for criminal appeals in Utah.

The appropriate standard,

which was followed by the Court of Appeals, was articulated in
State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975).

The Utah Supreme

Court stated:
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
his conviction, it must appear that, viewing
the evidence and inferences that may
reasonably be drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury,
reasonable minds could not believe him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mills, 530 P.2d 1272.

The Court of Appeals followed precisely

^Appellant incorrectly cites Scharf v. BMG Corp., as "State
v. BMG Corporation."
15

the standard which was articulated in Mills and subsequent Utah
case law.

Warden. 784 P.2d 1204, 1208-1209.
Utah courts have expressed a willingness to overturn

jury verdicts where
conviction.

evidence

is insufficient

to

sustain

the

For example, in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah

1983), the defendant was convicted at trial of second-degree
murder.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the conviction was

reversed

upon

grounds

that

the

evidence

presented

by

the

prosecution failed to prove that the defendant "intentionally and
knowingly11 caused the death of the victim.
State

v.

Bolsinger,

699

P.2d

1214

Id. at 444.
(Utah

1985)

See also
(evidence

insufficient to convict defendant of second-degree murder); State
v. Johnson, 663 JP.2d 48 (Utah 1983) (evidence insufficient to
convict defendants of theft by deception); State v. Anderton, 668
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983).
Similarly, in the instant case, the state failed to
present

evidence

sufficient

to

sustain

a

conviction

for

negligent homicide.
B,

In

Appellant
confuses the standard
for
"conflicting evidence11 with the standard for
"insufficiency of evidence."
response

to

the

Court

of

Appeal's

opinion,

appellant contends that the court failed to recognize the rule
regarding "conflicting evidence" (Appellant's Brief, page 10).
16

Appellant

correctly

states

the r u ^

-. :r>i

rule

•

ipplied

:.«.

verdict where ~:\c

preclude

J

O ^ T from reversing a jury

evidence presentees r

the burden

but

nJ, 1 u/t i I'K.j fv idence 11

J J ntc

: .

In Tolman,

cue state fails to meet

therefore, "reasonable minds must have

entertained

reasonable doubt that the defendant committed

< :rime \ ::: >f

w : t • n :i)i n r i c ited. " T o l m a n ,

-

77 5 P 2d

the

42 2 , 12 4 ,

Indeed, the Court of Appeals did not assert that it reversed the
trial c o u r t f s verdict on the qrounds th.it the defendant presented
"con

* nrr anH

grounds

tha:

v

r»-

rontradicz^i',

3\

prosecution

failed

dence,
o

but

rather

present

;—
the

on

evidence

the
of

1 in otht' r wot «Js ,

state ^

evidence

failed

r

sh .

o

i "substantial

and

unjustifiable risk of death existed of which the Defendant should
have been aware."

Warden, 784 P.2d at 1 2 09

.

Appeals

:ollowed

the

properly

fluff i <: i ent 7

i \ i ev . :

Utah

"i- ,

law

regarding

the Court of
review

of

See s t a t e v . Watson , h K i P, 2d 3 9 „ 4 L

(Utah 1 9 8 4 ) ; State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) .
Appellant's

recital

"conflicting

i; t.amdanl doo . i 10 t ap^ *
Warden's

conviction

on

^ppeai
the

grounds

of

B

reversal of Dr.

"insufficiency

evidence,"
II.

evidence"

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A T TRIAL FAILED TO
SHOW THAT DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED A

of

"SUBSTANTIAL AND UNJUSTIFIABLE RISK" WHICH
WAS A "GROSS DEVIATION" FROM THE STANDARD OF
CARE THUS CAUSING THE DEATH OF THE CHILD.
In

Utah,

in

order

to

be

convicted

of

negligent

homicide, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was guilty of criminal negligence.

Utah Code Ann. §7 6-

5-206 (1990) . A person engages in conduct:
With criminal negligence or is criminally
negligent with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct are the result of his
conduct when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise in all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
Utah

Code

reviewing

Ann.
the

§76-2-103(4)
trial

court's

(1990)
record,

(emphasis
the

added).

Court

of

Upon
Appeals

correctly concluded that the evidence presented failed to show
that a "substantial and unjustifiable risk" of death to the child
existed of which Defendant should have been aware.
P.2d at 1209.
to meet

Warden, 784

The State's quantum of evidence was insufficient

its burden of proof and the reversal of Defendant's

conviction was appropriate.
A.

The evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to establish that
Defendants conduct constituted a
substantial and unjustifiable risk.
18

Standard of Care •
Al

;

. the prosecution

el :i el ted

expert

testimony

from D r s . Kramer and Chan that: it: w a s outside t h e standard of
i": a r e

f o r D e f' e n d a n f 1' i1 I e i i v c,.i 11 i e

i t h h :i s g r a n dm o t h e r a n d

mother w h e n t h e baby w a s premature and manifested
possible respirator
page
5).
I,he

{'

istress.

......

T

naqt

symptoms of

-; ^ ^ ,
.

;;.,t:

±±ne

23-

page 257, line

' ~ was conceded, however . that :here was * •-• chance that
.

.

line 19 - page 26 1,

line 6 ) .

-e:-.<-•-

.

:i, .it

J"// ,

Furthermore, D r . Chan stated that,

while h e was nf t h e opinion that Defendant's conduct w a s outside
the standard

Df care,

with h i s assessment
line

\1J)

other competent

physicians m a y disagree

(T. V o l . Ill, page 273, 1 i ne 6 - page 275,

in 'linrl' , -iippel 1 diit

i;dih<ii

! o show

tint" P"f:> t Hnddiii " s'

conduct w a s necessarily outside t h e civil standard or care - let
alone t h e criminal standard.
110I

11nl1cdl.il'

Defendant's
1204
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UI'M«

conduct
(1 Jtah

ridlhui'e

Appellant's expert testimony did

or

jegree

a s required
Ct

App

State
] 989)

o f risk

caused

v . Warden,
Appel lai it'"' s

by

784 P.2d
e vi dence

therefore did not meet t h e "substantial and unjustifiable risk 11
burden of proving criminal negligence.
2.

Defendant's Conduct w a s not t h e cause of the
Child's Death,

For a person to be convicted of negligent homicide, the
state must prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that the alleged

"gross deviation" from the standard of care "caused the death" of
the victim.

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206(1) and §76-2-103(4) (1988).

In the instant case, there is insufficient evidence to establish
the necessary causal link between Defendant's conduct and the
death of Jareth Young.
The State alleged that Defendant's conduct was outside
the

medical

standard

of

care,

thus

giving

rise

to

certain

"substantial and unjustifiable risks" which caused the death of
the child.

Those risks are stated as follows:
(A) Vaginal Bleeding.

The State elicited expert testimony from Drs. Bitner
and Branch that vaginal bleeding on the day of delivery gave rise
to a potentially serious problem (placenta previa, abrupto, etc.)
necessitating

hospital

evaluation.

Since Defendant

responded

with conservative care (watch and wait) as opposed to requiring
Joanne to be admitted to the hospital, the State contends he was
outside the applicable standard of care (T. Vol. II, page 172page 259; Vol. Ill, page 155 - page 233).
However, the testimony of the doctors makes it clear
that the bleeding did not result in a placental accident (T. Vol.
II, page 240, line 19 - page 241, line 8; Vol. Ill, page 203,
20

line 11 -- page 2 0 5,

1 J ine 2 ) , did not injure the child nor result

dOiisequtjTit 1 y , t.tici.'w 11» no uiiusd I 1 \ nk, between Ihe

i ii its death ,

bleeding and the deviation from the alleged medical standard.
(B)

Leaving

the child with ,.Ivy_ and Joanna

Iulluwmq

Its birth without insisting upon hospitalization:
Both Drs. Kramer and Chan testified that the child's
1! ife mi ght ha v e beei I spared had 1 t r ecei v ed medical attentioi I up
to 1! hours after birth, (T. Vol, ]], |»age 290 , Line 18 - page
Z92f

i

jLne

14^

T^

Voi<

iJ

|^

p((ll|e

264(

|ine

f

_

()aqe

?(i6(

!iri)1 „

^

Since the chi Id was born at 1 0:40 p.m. , his 1 Ife may have been
spared had he received medical attention as late as 9:40' a.m. to

Defendant

assessed

Ivy

Young

as

being

observing the child immediate! y fol lowi ng the hi rth

capable

of

She was the

mother of seven, four of whom were born at home (T. Vol. IV, page
52 #

1 ine 8

the

child

page 55, 1 i ne 1)

must

be

observed

Fol lowi ng delivery, he advised

during

the night

regarding

its

temperature, color and respirations and, further, to phone if the
chi J,r| worsened

naa^ Qfi. line 13'- page A)i:

( Id.

.ine .-) .

Ivy acknowledged that Dr. Warden asked her to observe the child
D I!

1 I, p a g e 4 I.I

I i n e s ] 9- 22)

although she

denied that Defendant instructed her on which symptoms to watch
(T. Vol. I, page 85, lines 22-23).
Nevertheless, she knew the body temperature of a new
born infant was important to its health (T. Vol. II, page 44,
line 14-20) and that it was a very serious emergency if the .child
had difficulty breathing (Id. at page 64, line 18 - page 68, line
11).

During the night, she observed the extremities of the child

becoming more blue (Id. at page 54, lines 14-19).

She observed

the child's labored breathing and, at approximately 8:00 a.m.,
thought the child had stopped breathing (Id. at page 64, line 18
- page 68, line 11).

She knew that she was to call the doctor

if the child's condition worsened (£d. at page 51, line 6-20).
Notwithstanding, she failed to timely call the Defendant and when
she did so, and he was not in, she failed to identify herself or
leave word of an emergency

(Id. at page 69, lines 2-13; page 71,

line 7, page 72, line 4 and T. Vol. V, page 23, line 17 - page
24, line 21).

Finally, she failed to seek alternate emergency

medical aid from any other source.
Since the child may have lived had medical attention
been obtained within 11-12 hours after birth, and since the delay
in obtaining the medical care was the fault of the grandmother
rather than Defendant, the evidence proffered by the state was
insufficient

to

convict the

Defendant of: negligent homicide.
22

The child f s death was not caused b^ Defendant leaving 'cue
v i tin

iami I y ,

uie

grandmother

failed

leather , i +" resn . id
to

reasonably

aot

id it: ion

. .

evidence

that

chilli's deter iorat i n
There
foreseen

that

is
Ivy

Young

because

when

she

child

thp

ch : . i * s

perceived

the

should

have

him

seek

Defendant

woul -< ta x. I G contact

or

a ] ter it l a tie emergency medical c JLL v a i r_ -?r havi r\a perceived that the
child's

condition

was
u\v,\ I

I 'or rf'ctl ;y
inconclusive111

to

worsening.
l.ha t

establish

/tiu-

- :>> Court

• *•
that

there

was

-as
a

of

Appeals

; r i ciently

substantial

and

unjustifiable.risk of death such that defendant should have been
iw a i i -iJ t iI
••

|!

Warden, 7 8 4 P. 2 c:i at 12 39 .
The evidence presented by Defendant
demonstrated that his conduct was
within the standard of care.

When estab 1. i sh Iruj t hn appropi: i ate standard
trial,

Defendant

White.

Dr. white, a respected home delivery practitioner who had

del ivered

elicited

approximate v

years, concluded that
I est I ninny,

Mr

Wh

expert

from

Dr.

Gregory

.ac.es a+* home, over the past
Warden had acted appropriately.
I ed

surrounding Joanne Young *s pregnancy
been appropriate

testimony

o I ca re at

(T. v^x. xv, page

l h

"" '• •

{i

* 1 /:=i

;

40

In his
rcumstances

-jome delivery would have
.46;.

lie concluded that an

i lltrasound was not reqin rp.d under the circumstances

(Jd. at ,^0)

and

that hospitalization

was not required

upon the mother's

"spotting" (Id. at 254).
Dr. White added that a physical examination was not
needed after the mother's cramping and spotting ceased or when
she experienced 15 minute contractions (Id. at 257-59); that Dr.
Warden's examination of the newborn was adequate and appropriate
(Id. at 266-69); that the examination and prematurity of the baby
did not indicate immediate hospitalization (Id. at 271) ; that the
infant's

grunting

did

not

demand

immediate

hospitalization,

especially when relieved by a change of position (Id. at 274-75) ;
and that it would be appropriate to leave the child in the care
of its grandmother and mother with instructions to call him upon
observing a change of condition
Warden's

conduct

did

(Id. at 277).

not deviate

from the

In short, Dr.

standard

of

care

applicable in a home delivery setting.
Thus, in assessing the testimony offered by both the
appellant

and

the

Defendant,

it

is

clear

that

appellant's

evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant's

conduct

created

risk" of death to the child.

a

"substantial

and

unjustifiable

First, appellant's evidence failed

to demonstrate that Defendant's conduct was clearly outside the
standard of care for home delivery (T. Vol. Ill, page 273, line 6
- page 275, line 15). In contrast, Defendant's expert testimony
24

indicated that h i s conduct w a s w i t h i n t h e standard
VI.JI

I V , piiqc

, In- ''| • S e c o n d ,

of care

t h e bl:ai e t a i l e d

iT

t"o m e e t t h e

burden of proving that Defendant's conduct constituted a "gross
dev i a t i o n
Appealfs

f r on t h e s t a i i cl a r d • :> f c a r e ,'
reversal

of Defendant's

A s s \ 1c h

conviction

t fi e

Co u i t o f

w a s correct and

should b e affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The decision

of the Utah

reversed t h e convi cti on of Dr

Court

of Appeals

Warden which

correctly

.s'hou1d be i ffir med

for t h e follou.. ^ reasons:
First
s tandar :l

Appeals

correctly

applied t h e

.: : i c I e n c y

cf

of

ev Id e iic e

presented at -: : t.
Second,
evidence

?

une

* . ^«*

at *" ^ * =•1 *~^

esent
conduct

"substantial and unjustifiabl

isk1*

f h,at' line sho'i.t I

t death
-) u

that h i s conduct constituted i

to

si if f i c i e n t

constituted
the

child

a

such

f ri ,. 1 e d t :) e s t a. b 1 i s h

^rosr deviation from t h e standard

of care."
Th ird,

i'

:efense,:s

testimony

defendant's conduct was within the standard
deliveries.

25

established

that

of care for home

Fourth,

appellant's

contention

that

the

Court

of

Appeals should have applied the standard for "conflicting and
contradictory evidence" is misplaced.

The Court did not reverse

defendant's conviction on the grounds that defendant presented
contradictory

evidence, but rather on grounds that the state

failed to present sufficient evidence establishing Defendant's
guilt of criminal negligence beyond a reasonable doubt.

is
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Defendant finally claims that his right Lo
compulsory process and discovery was denied by the quashing of his subpoenas duces tecum at the preliminary hearing. In
quashing defendant's subpoenas, the magistrate instructed defendant to follow the
provisions of rule 16 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure in his discovery efforts.
Defendant apparently followed this instruction with the State's cooperation. The
record is devoid of any expression of dissatisfaction or objection to this method of
discovery, and there is no evidence that
defendant was prejudiced.
Having reviewed defendant's other
claims of error, we find them to be without
merit
Affirmed.
HOWE, Associate CJ., and
STEWART and DURHAM, U, concur.
ZIMMERMAN 1, concurs in the
result

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
David R. WARDEN, Jr., M.D.,
Defendant and Appellant
No. 880575-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 22, 1989
rtoheai ing Denied Jan. "19, 1000
Physician was convicted of negligent
homicide in regard to his home delivery of
infant by the Second Circuit Court, Layton
Department, K. Roger Bean, J., and physician appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Bench, J., held that (1) expert testimony
was required; (2) experts were properly

liwlified, and (3) evidence was insufficient
to support conviction.
Reversed.
Greenwood, J., filed opinion u»m umng
in part and dissenting in part.
1. Homicide <s»74
Negligent homicide involves defendant's perception of risk and necessarily
requires evaluation of his or her state of
mind.
2. Homicide <3=>282
Whether defendant negligently fails to
perceive risk and thus is guilty of negligent
homicide is question of fact for jury
3. Homicide <3=>230
Expert testimony is not required to
prove mental state of criminal defendant
accused of homicide.
4. Homicide <s»250
Expert testimony was required in trial
of physician for negligent homicide of infant he delivered at mother's home; without understanding of nature and degree of
risk, jury could not determine whether risk
was substantial and if so, whether physician's failure to perceive it was grossly
negligent and risk was not oije within common knowledge and experience of laypersons.
5. Criminal Law <3»479
State's medical witnesses were properly qualified as experts to testify against
physician charged with negligent homicide
in home delivery of infant, despite fact that
experts did not attend home deliveries; no
board certification or recognized medical
specialty in home delivery existed and
medical principles applicable to delivery of
infants were applicable regardless of
whether birth occurs at home or in hospital
6. Homicide <£=>250
Evidence was insufficient to sustain
conviction of physician on charge of negligent homicide in home delivery of infant, in
regard to physician's failure to hospitalize
infant who was born with respiratory distress; expert medical witnesses testified

STATE v. WARDEN

Utah 1205

Cite a« 784 PJtd 12 •4 (UtahApp. 1989)

that when physician left patient's home,
baby's vital signs were acceptable, and that
it was very unusual for child to die at this
gestation and birth weight from hyaline
membrane disease.
Darwin C. Hansen, Bountiful, for defendant and appellant
Melvin C. Wilson and Brian J. Namba,
Parmington, for plaintiff and respondent
OPINION
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and
BULLOCK,1 JJ.
BENCH, Judge:
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of
negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206
(1978). We reverse the conviction.
PACTS
Defendant David R. Warden, Jr., is a
licensed and board-certified physician who
began practicing family medicine in Kaysville, Utah, in 1968. As part of his practice, defendant provides obstetrical care,
and estimates that he has attended approximately 2500 births, 300 of which have been
home deliveries.
In September 1986, defendant was visited in his office by Joanne Young, who
consulted defendant because she was pregnant out-of-wedlock and wanted to have
her baby at home. Joanne testified that
she was embarrassed about her pregnancy
and "didn't want to have to go to the
hospital and have people know." She also
expressed a desire to keep the expenses of
birth to a minimum. Defendant evaluated
her for home delivery, considering the risks
of her pregnancy, the proximity of hospital
facilities, and the availability of family support to care for the infant and mother after
birth. Defendant determined that Joanne's
pregnancy was low risk and that medical
facilities were nearby. He also learned
that Joanne's mother, Ivy, was to be the
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah

primary caretaker after birth and that Ivy
had given birth at home to four of her
seven children. Based on this evaluation,
defendant decided that Joanne was a suitable candidate for home delivery and
agreed to attend the birth. He also made
arrangements to obtain Joanne's medical
records from her previous doctor, and on
the basis of that information and his own
examination, calculated her delivery date to
be in early December.
On the morning of November 7, Joanne
began experiencing vaginal bleeding. Ivy
called defendant, who was in Salt Lake
City at the time. Defendant expressed concern that labor was beginning and advised
Ivy to confine Joanne to bed and to contact
him immediately if the bleeding became
heavier or if strong contractions began.
That afternoon, Ivy called defendant again
and told him that the bleeding had stopped.
She also told him. that she had spoken with
the father of the child and that he had told
her that conception had occurred a month
earlier than originally believed. Defendant
testified that this information led him to
think that the labor was not premature,
and he advised her to call again as labor
continued. Ivy dlid so that evening, reporting that Joanne was having occasional contractions. Defendant told her to call back
when the contractions were three to five
minutes apart. At about 10:15 p.m., Ivy
informed defendant that the final stage of
labor had begun. Defendant arrived at the
house fifteen minutes later.
Shortly thereafter, Joanne gave breech
birth to a male infant which appeared to be
healthy, but weighed only an estimated
four to five pounds. The baby exhibited
some respiratory distress which defendant
attributed to prematurity. Defendant testified that he suggested hospitalization of
the infant to Ivy, but that Ivy was concerned because there was no health insurance to cover those expenses. (Ivy denied
that she ever discussed with defendant hospitalization of the infant.) Defendant instructed Ivy how to position the infant to
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1989).
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relieve some of the respiratory distress and
showed Joanne how to nurse the baby He
also instructed Ivy to keep the child warm
and to monitor the baby's temperature, color, and breathing. After instructing Ivy to
call him if there were any changes in the
baby's condition, defendant left at about
11:30 p.m.
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and
the baby into a warmer room. Ivy noticed
that the child's hands and feet were "very
blue," but did not call defendant At 8:00
a.m., the baby appeared to have stopped
breathing. Ivy attempted to resuscitate
him for about twenty minutes, and apparently the infant responded. She then
called defendant's office, but was told he
was at home. When Ivy called defendant's
home, his wife advised her he was not
there, but would be in his office by 9:30
a.m. In neither call did she identify herself, leave a message, nor report that there
was any emergency. She apparently was
aware defendant was not inaccessible in
such a situation, but did not make further
attempts to reach him. She did not take
the infant to the hospital or notify emergency services. She testified that in England, her native home, "you would have
had to have a doctor's permission to have
called an ambulance."
At about 8:30 a.m, Ivy called a fnend
but did not tell her that the child was
having difficulty breathing. She also
called her clergyman, but did not advise
him until 9:30 or 10:00 a.m. that the baby
was having respiratory difficulty. The
clergyman called a local pediatrician, who
arrived at the Youngs' home at about 10:30
a.m. only to find the infant "lifeless." The
baby was taken to i hospital, but was
pronounced dead shortly after arrival.
A postmortem examination revealed that
the infant was born approximately six to
seven weeks premature and had died from
respiratory distress caused by prematurity
of the lungs (hyaline membrane disease).
Defendant subsequently was charged with
one count of negligent homicide.
An initial jury trial ended in a mistrial
prior to the rendition of a verdict A second jury trial was held February 22-?6

1988, and defendant was convicted as
charged. Defendant's motions to arrest
judgment and for a new trial were denied.
ISSUES
Defendant raises essentially two issues
on appeal, arguing for a reversal of his
conviction. He first claims that the State's
expert witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the applicable medical standard
of care. Second, he argues that there was
insufficient evidence to establish that his
conduct deviated significantly from the applicable standard of care and that there
was a causal connection between his conduct and the baby's death.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
ri, 2] Conduct constituting the crime of
negligent homicide occurs when an "actor,
acting with criminal negligence, causes the
death of another." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-206(1) (1978). The culpable mental
state for criminal negligence requires "only
that a defendant 'ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk' of
death." State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254,
267 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-103(4) (1978)); see also 2 C. Torcia,
Wharton's Criminal Law § 168 (14th ed.
1979). Furthermore, "[t]he risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the failure
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint" Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4)
(1978). Consequently, negligent homicide
involves a defendant's perception of risk
ind necessarily requires an evaluation of
his or her state of mind. State v. Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523, 525-26 (Utah CtApp.
1989). Whether a defendant negligently
fails to perceive the risk is a question of
fact for the jury. See State v. Howard,
597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979). However,
the risk of death "must be of such a degree
that an ordinary person would not ... fail
to recognize it" State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d
142, 148 (Utah 1983),

STATE v. WARDEN
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Because the "failure to perceive the risk
constitutes a gross deviation from the reasonable man standard," ordinary negligence adequate in the civil law is insufficient to constitute criminal negligence.
State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah
1979); see also Standiford, 769 P.2d at
267; 2 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law
§ 168 (terms such as "criminal negligence"
are intended to connote deviations from
reasonableness significantly greater in degree than ordinary negligence). Thus,
"[m]ere inattention or mistake in judgment
resulting even in death of another is not
criminal unless the quality of the act makes
it so." People v. Rodriguez, 186 Cal.
App.2d 433, 8 CaLRptr. 863, 868 (1960).
EXPERT TESTIMONY
[3] Defendant contends that expert testimony was required in this case to establish the "standard of care," but that the
State's medical experts were not qualified
to testify. On the other hand, the State
argues that expert medical testimony was
not required, and that it needed only to
present "competent evidence to show the
nature and degree of risk and the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint" The State correctly observes that
the "standard of care" in section 76-2103(4) refers to the actor's mental state, as
opposed to medical malpractice cases in
which expert medical testimony is required
to show the applicable standard of medical
care. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763
P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct.App.1988). I t is
also true that expert testimony is not required to prove the mental state of a criminal defendant accused of homicide. See
State v. Nicholson, 585 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah
1978).
[4] We conclude, however, that expert
testimony was required in this case since
such testimony was necessary to establish
the nature and degree of risk. Section
76-5-206(1) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's
judgment was criminally deficient because
2. This is distinct from expert testimony as to the
subjective intent of the defendant, i.e., "the actor's viewpoint," which need not be accepted by
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he failed to perceive a substantial risk that
death could occur. Without an understanding of the nature and degree of risk,
the jury could not determine whether the
risk was substantial, and if so, whether
defendant's failure to perceive it was
grossly negligent Unless the risk is one
within the common knowledge and experience of laypersons, it is unlikely that a jury
could make an informed determination of
culpability.2 We believe that expert testimony is required where criminal negligence
is alleged and the nature and degree of risk
are beyond the ken of the average layperson. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Ward, 422
F.Supp. 934 (W.D.N.Y.1976) (State's use of
expert medical testimony at trial supplied
sufficient evidence of criminal negligence
for negligent homicide conviction in death
of mother on whom physician had performed legal abortion).
[5] Defendant argues that the State's
expert medical witnesses did not qualify as
experts because they do not attend home
deliveries. The witnesses included two obstetrician/gynecologists, a pediatrician, and
a neonatologist Citing the medical malpractice case of Burton v. Youngblood,
711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985) (a practitioner of one school of medicine is not competent to testify as an expert against the
practitioner of another school), defendant
argues that the State's doctors were not
qualified to testify because they were of a
different school of medicine than defendant
The qualification of an expert witness is
a matter within the sound discretion of the
trial court. State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d
420, 421 (Utah 1986). There was evidence
in the record liiat there is no board certification or recognized medical specialty in
home delivery. There was also evidence
that the medical principles applicable to the
delivery of babies are applicable whether a
birth occurs at home or in a hospital. In
view of the record evidence, the trial court
was within its discretion to qualify the
State's medical witnesses as experts. Cf.
the court and which is ultimately a determination for the jury.
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and determined it to be about five pounds.
Defendant also said he believed the baby to
be two to three weeks premature. Defendant was aware that the baby was having
"grunting respirations," which he said was
a sign of early respiratory distress syndrome. Defendant positioned the baby in
such a way that the labored breathing was
relieved. He further testified that the severity of the respiratory distress did not
indicate a need for hospitalization. He said
that he informed Ivy that the baby was
premature and had difficulty in breathing,
but that the baby was then stable. He
instructed Ivy to call him if there was any
change and admitted that he was depending on Ivy to carefully watch the infant
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Before leaving the Young residence, defen[6] Defendant claims that the evidence dant noted that the respiratory difficulty
presented was insufficient to establish had subsided. He stated, "The baby was
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt To con- respiring well, the baby was still awake
vict a person of violating section 76-5- and alert and muscle tone was still good."
206(1), the State must establish, beyond a He also said,
reasonable doubt, both prohibited conduct
I was impressed that the baby had aland a culpable mental state. To establish a
ready shown some signs of respiratory
culpable mental state, the prosecution must
distress syndrome, but under similar cirpresent evidence that defendant was uncumstances in the past, I have left babies
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
at home, having instructed the mother on
risk of death, but should have been so
how to nurse, having instructed the
aware.
mother to keep the baby warm and therefore I felt I could leave, confident that
We review defendant's claim under a
grandma would call me, confident that if
standard that does not permit us to substithere were any progression of symptoms
tute our judgment for that of the jury in a
that I would be called.
criminal trial. See State v. Tolman, 775
P.2d 422, 424 (Utah CtApp.1989). Rather,
Defendant later testified that of 300
we review the evidence and all inferences home births he had attended, approximatewhich may reasonably be drawn from it ly ten of those babies had been premature.
in the light most favorable to the verdict Eight of those had had respiratory distress,
of the jury. We reverse a jury convic- but defendant said that he had hospitalized
tion for insufficient evidence only when only three of those eight In the case of
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently this infant, defendant testified that "in my
inconclusive or inherently improbable experience and the judgment that I applied
that reasonable minds must have enter- at the time based on experience with babies
tained a reasonable doubt that the defen- who are even smaller than this delivered at
dant committed the crime of which he home, they can in many cases get along
very, very well
"
was convicted.
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah
The State's expert medical witnesses tes1985) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d tified that although the mother and baby
443, 444 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. "would do better" in a hospital, defendant's
Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477. (Utah 1989). evaluation of the infant's well-being would
Defendant testified at trial that the indicate that the baby's vital signs were
grandparents weighed the newborn baby "acceptable." They conceded that the in-

Burton, 711 P.2d at 249 (if methods and
procedures of general plastic surgeon were
shown to be identical to those of specialized
plastic surgeon, one may testify against
the other); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985)
(nothing precludes testimony from expert
in another trade if the standard is the same
for both). "The critical factor in determining the competency of an expert is whether
that expert has knowledge that can assist
the trier of fact in resolving the issues
before it" Id. at 253; see also Utah
R.Evid. 702. We conclude that the trial
court committed no abuse of discretion in
allowing the State's experts to testify.

STATE v. WARDEN
Cite as 784 P.2d 1204 (UtahApp. 1989)

fant may have survived had he been hospitalized up to ten hours after birth, but
believed that leaving the baby at home was
"bad judgment" on defendant's part 3
The State's neonatologist testified that
hyaline membrane disease is a progressive
disease. He also indicated that a baby in
the condition of the deceased is typically
"at high risk for medical and surgical problems." As far as mortality for an infant
with the disease, however, he stated that
the failure to provide therapy would only
place the probability of death at five to
fifteen percent He later stated upon
cross-examination that statistically only
two percent of babies die from untreated
hyaline membrane disease. He further
said, "I guess the message is if s very
unusual and rare to lose a baby at this
gestation and this birth weight from hyaline membrane disease."
Asked whether it would be outside the
medical standard of care to have the family
of a home-delivered newborn to monitor
any changes in the baby's condition, the
neonatologist believed it was, but conceded
that other competent physicians would disagree with him. Other experts for the
State testified that the medical community
in Utah does not teach or train physicians
for home delivery and generally recommends against it
We are convinced that even looking at
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict, that evidence was "sufficiently
inconclusive" to establish that there was a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death
such that defendant should have been
aware of it Thus in examining the evidence presented, reasonable minds must
have entertained "a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted." See Booker, 709
P.2d at 345.
Since we conclude that the evidence
failed to establish criminal negligence, we
need not reach the issue whether defen3. Our research has revealed very few cases in
which licensed physicians have been charged
with negligent homicide. In many of those
cases where such a charge has been brought,
albeit under differing statutes, the courts have
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dantfs acts or omissions were the legal
cause of death.
Defendant's conviction is reversed.
BULLOCK, J., concurs.
GREENWOOD, Judge: (concurring
and dissenting).
I concur in Judge Bench's opinion concerning expert testimony, but dissent from
the opinion's conclusion that there was not
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's
conviction of negligent homicide. The majority opinion correctly states the necessary
quantum of evidence for negligent homicide as being where the defendant should
have been aware of a substantial and unjustified risk of death, but was not State
v. Wessendorf, 111 P.2d 523, 525 (Utah
Ct.App.1989). Also, the risk must be such
that an ordinary person would not disregard or fail to recognize it State v.
Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983).
Therefore, in this case, the State was required to convince the jury that there was
a substantial and unjustified risk that the
infant would die if he did not receive medical care in a hospital-type setting; that
defendant was unaware that the risk existed; and that an ordinary person in defendant's position would have recognized that
risk. Our task as; an appellate court, is to
determine if the evidence presented, when
viewed favorably to the jury verdict, "is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d
342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Pe*
tree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983)).
My assessment of the evidence supporting the jury verdict is as follows: defendant was a licensed physician who had
maintained a family practice since 1968,
including obstetrical care; defendant assumed responsibility for the infant's physical well-being by agreeing to deliver it at
held that no criminal liability attaches when
death results from an error of judgment See
generally Annotation, Homicide Predicated on
Improper Treatment of Disease or Injury, 45 AX.
R.3d 114 (1972).
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home; defendant did not insist on examining the mother when she reported vaginal
bleeding to determine if premature birth
was likely or if so, what precautions should
be taken to minimize the likelihood of premature birth; defendant diagnosed the infant after birth as having Respiratory Distress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to
position the infant in a way which relieved
the symptoms but would not alleviate the
condition itself; defendant minimized the
seriousness of the infant's condition to Ivy
and Joanne; three of the ten children he
had delivered who had Respiratory Distress Syndrome were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant could die from the
disease and that the disease was progressive; defendant could not himself admit the
infant into a hospital because he lacked
malpractice insurance, so would have to
call another physician or have the infant
admitted through an emergency room facility; Ivy testified that defendant only told
her to watch the infant for changes in his
temperature, color and respiration, without
advising her as to the degree of change
which might indicate a crisis, nor did he
warn her or Joanne that death could result
from the disease; and defendant left the
infant in the care of laypersons.
There was other, conflicting evidence
which would indicate that defendant should
not have been aware that a substantial risk
existed. However, the existence of conflicting evidence, by itself, does not justify
reversal of a jury verdict State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424-25 (Utah CtApp.
1989). The jury has been through the arduous task of listening to and assessing the
evidence presented in this most difficult
case, and I do not think that we should
appropriately substitute our judgment for
that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was
based on what defendant knew or the jury
believed he knew at the time, and its assessment that given that knowledge he
should have known the risks. I do not find
the evidence "sufficiently inconclusive/' as
do my colleagues, to justify conviction. I
would conclude that the record, while heatedly controverted, contains sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant should have been aware that a sub-

stantial and unjustified risk of death existed, and to convict defendant of negligent
homicide as a result

REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC, a
Utah corporation, Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent,
v.
Roland W. REICHERT, Defendant,
Respondent, and Cross-Appellant
No- 88024&-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 24, 1989.
Employer brought action against salesman for breach of noncompetition agreement After denying salesman's motion to
amend counterclaim, the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Pat B. Brian, J.,
entered judgment on jury verdict awarding
slightly less than $800 in damages and
awarded contractual attorney fees in
amount of $7,500 rather than almost $27,000 that had been sought Parties appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held
that (1) salesman bore burden of proving
that there was no reasonable relationship
between actual damages suffered by employer as result of his breach and amount
employer would collect under agreement's
liquidated damages provision; (2) liquidated damages provision was not unreasonable as a matter of law; (3) unexplained
reduction of attorney fees sought could not
stand on appeal; and (4) motion to amend
counterclaim was properly denied.
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part
1. Damages «=>163(3)
In context of noncompetition agreement's liquidated damages provision, sales-

